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r5UPREMIE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
SUPREME COURT O MICHIGAN.
2
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. $
ADMIRALTY.
Juridiction.-A contract for the transportation of passengers oy a
steamship on the ocean is a maritime contract, and there igno distinction
in principle between it and a contract for the like transportation of mer-
chandise: The Moses Taylor, 4 Wallace.
The distinguishing and characteristic feature of a suit in admiralty,
is that the vessel or thing proceeded against is itself seized and im-
pleaded as the defendant, and is judged and sentenced accordingly:
Id.
The provision of the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, which vests
in the District Courts of the United States exclusive cognisance of civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, is constitutional: Id.
A.LLuVION.
R ght to.-The right to alluvion depends upon the fact of contiguity
of the estate to the river. Hence where accretion is made before a strip
of land bordering on a river, the accretion belongs to it and not to the
larger parcel behind it and from which the strip when sold was separated:
Saulet v. Sh4herd, 4 Wallace.
ATTORNEY.
As a Witness-Interest to disgualify.-The possibility that an action
may be brought against an attorney for neglect of duty, is too remote
and contingent to affect his competency as a witness for his client: .Braine
v. Spalding, 52 Penna.
The true test of interest in a witness is, that he will either gain or
lose as the direct legal effect of the judgment, or that the record will be
legal evidence for or against him in some other action: Id.
His liability to a like action is an interest in the question only, and
does not exclude him. His interest from liability over, must result from
an obligation to indemnify the party calling him: Id.
An attorney employed to collect a note is liable to his client for not
using reasonable skill and diligernce; but there is no bligation to in-
demnify: Id.
The indorser, at his own request, received from the attorney the note
and undertook to have it put into the hands of a magistrate for collection
from the drawer. .Held, that he had waived the necessity of presenta-
tion and protest, and was estopped in a suit against himself on the note
from objecting to the competency of the attorney as a witness: Td.
I From -T W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. 4 of his Reports.
2 From Hon. T. M. Cooley; to appear in 15 Michigan Reports.
From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 52 Penna. State Reports.
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BANK.
Liability of Surety of a Teller.-A teller of a bank was a defaulter
to it at the time sureties entered into a new bond for the faithful per-
formance of his duties, &c. Beld, if the bank fraudulently concealed
that he was then a defaulter, the sureties would not be liable for a sub-
sequent default: Wayne v. Commercial National Bank, 52 Penna.
But where the bank had no reason to suspect the teller, and there was
no request by the surety to investigate his accounts, omission of the
bank to make such investigation, would not discharge the surety: Id.
The teller, having authority to issue "due-bills" for the bank for a
special purpose, issued them to raise money for himself; neither he nor
his surety could set up a want of power in the bank to issue them: nor
that the due-bills were not properly stamped: Id.
When the default of the principal would forfeit the bond as to him,
it would forfeit it as to the surety: Id.
BILLs AND NOTES.
Negotiability.-A note for a sum certain, payable in Michigan with
current exchange on New York, is a negotiable promissory note: Johnson
v. F rsbie, 15 Mich.
CHECK.
Where Drawer has no Funds.-Drawing a cheek on a bank in which
the drawer has no funds, and uttering it, is fraud; both on the person
to whom it is negotiated and on the bank: Peterson v. Union National
Bank, 52 Penna.
It is fraud in the holder of a check to present it for payment, when
he knows the drawer has no funds in the bank to meet it: Id.
The holder of a check deposited it in the bank on which it was drawn,
knowing that the drawer had no funds to meet it; it was passed to the
holder's credit and charged against the drawer. Held, that this was not
payment of the check by the bank and that the holder could not recover
the amount from the bank: .Zd.
COMMON CARIRs.
Refusal to carry Passenger back to Country from which he has been
banished.-Although a common carrier of passengers by sea, as a master
of a steamship, may properly refuse a passage to a person who has been
forcibly expelled by the actual though violent and revolutionary autho-
rities of a town, under threat of death if he return, and when the bring-
ing back and landing of such passenger would in the opinion of such
master tend to promote further difficulty-yet this refusal should precede
the sailing of the ship. If the passenger have violated no inflexible
rule of the ship in getting aboard the vessel, have paid or tendered
the passage-money, and have conducted himself properly during the
voyage, the master has no right, as matter of law, to stop a returning
vessel, put him aboard it, and send him back to the port of departure.
And if he do so, damages will be awarded against him on a proceeding
in admiralty: Pearson v. Duane, 4 Wallace.
However, where a person who had been thus banished fi'om a plac6
got ou board a vessel going back to it, determined to defy the autho-
rities there and take his chance of life, and the captain, who had not
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known the history of the case until after the vessel was at sea-on
meeting a return steamer, of a line to which his own vessel belonged-
stopped his own and sent the man aboard the returning one, to be taken
to the port where he embarked-such captain, not acting in any malice,
but acting from a humane motive, and from a belief that the passenger,
if landed at the port where his own vessel was going, would be hanged-
in such a case, the apprehended danger mitigates the act, and the damages
must be small. Accordingly, in such a case, this court, on appeal from
a decree which had given four thousand dollars damages, modified it by
allowing but fifty dollars, with directions, moreover, that each party
should pay his own costs on the appeal: id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.-See Legal Teh n - Acts-Municipal Corpo-
ration.
Obligation of Contract.-Where a statute has authorized a municipal
corporation to issue bonds, and to exercise the power of local taxation
in order to pay them, and persons have bought and paid value for bonds
issued accordingly, the power of taxation thus given is a contract within
the meaning of the Constitution, and cannot be withdrawn until the
contract is satisfied. The state and the corporation in such a case are
equally bound: Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wallace.
A subsequently passed statute which repeals or restricts the power
of taxation so previously given, is , in so far. as it affects bonds bought
and held under the circumstances mentioned, a nullity; and it is the
duty of the corporation to impose and- collect the taxes in all respects
as if the second statute had not been passed: Id.
Certificates of discharge granted under insolvent laws passed by a
state cannot be pleaded in bar of an action brought by a citizen of
another state in the courts of the United States, or of any other state than
that where the discharge was obtained, unless it appear that the plain-
tiff proved his debt against the defendant's estate in insolvency, or in
some manner became a party to the proceedings: Baldwin v. Bale, 1
Wallace 223, 3 Am. Law Reg. 462, and Baldwin v. Bank of Newbury,
1 Wallace 234, affirmed, Gilman v. Lockwood, 4 Wallace.
The President.-The President of the United States cannot be re-
strained by injunction from carrying into effect an Act of Congress
alleged to be unconstitutional, nor will a bill having such a purpose be
allowed to be filed: State of Mississippi v. Johnson, President, 4 Wallace.
It makes no difference whether such incumbent of the presidential
office be described in the bill. as President, or simply as a citizen of a
state : Id.
Jury Trial.-The Constitution preserves the .right of trial by jury,
but provides that it shall be waived, in civil eases, unless demanded in
such manner as shall be provided by law. Under this provision, it is
not competent for. the legislature to provide that -cases which were triable
by jury wheir the Constitution was adopted may be brought and deter-
mined in chancery, unless provision is also made by which defendant, at
his option, can have trial by jury: Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich.
CONTRACTOR.
Liability of Principal for Negligence.-Where work done on a pub-
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lie highway necesgarily constitutes an obstruction or defect in the high-
way which renders it dangerous as a way for travel and transportation
unless properly guarded or shut out from public use, in such case a
principal for whom the work was done cannot defeat the just claim of a
municipal corporation which has had to pay damages, or of a private
party who has suffered injury, by proving that the work which consti-
tuted the obstruction or defect was done by an independent contractor :
Chicago City v. Robbins, 2 Black 418,.2 Am. Law Reg. 529, affirmed,
Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wallace.
CORPORATION.
Transfer of Stoc.-A purchaser of stock upon its transfer to him is
protected in his purchase although there was no right to make the trans-
fer: Bayard v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, 52 Penna.
Banks and other corporations are trustees for the property and title
of each owner of their stock. Having in their keeping the primary
evidence-of title, they are held to proper care and diligence in its pre-
servation, and may demand evidence of authority to transfer: Id..
Although generally the legal title is sufficient evidence of a right to
transfer, yet if a transfer would be a wrong to an equitable owner, the
corporation make themselves parties to the wrong if they permit it to be
done, knowing such equitable right: Id.
Letters of administration are always sufficient evidence of authority to
transfer, because a sale and transfer of stock is in the line of the duty
of administrators, whose primary duty is to dispose of the property, to
pay the debts of the intestate, and distribute the residue: Id.
A trustee of an insolvent debtor stands on the same footing, and
generally an executor, even if the stock may have been bequeathed
specifically, the transfer agent having no means of knowing whether it
will be necessary to pay debts: Id.
The powers of an executor or administrator differ from those of an
ordinary trustee, the duty of the latter being not administration, but
custody and management: Id.
A transfer agent before permitting the transfer of stock, appearing
on the face of the certificate to be held in trust, has a right,-especially
if the cestui que trust is named,-to require the exhibition of the au-
thority to transfer beyond the certificate: Id.
Ex pulsion of a Member.-The articles, conditions, and objects of an
association incorporated by the Supreme'.Court are their charter, and
have the same force and effect as if specifically granted by special Act
of Assembly; the charter cannot be questioned collaterally: Societyfor
the Visitation of the Sick, &c., v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meyer, 52
Penna.
In such charter, where the power of expulsion is conferred and a
member in accordance with its requirements has signed the articles, he
is bound by them, and the fitness of the objects, &c., is not a; subject
of judicial inquiry: Id.
When such member has been regularly tried and expelled, the sen-
tence of the society, acting judicially, cannot be inquired into collater-
ally, nor can the merits of his expulsion be re-examined: Id.
In an association one of whose objects was to provide assistance for
sick members;-to feign sickness or draw relief after recovery is sub-
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versive of the ftindamental objects of the association, an act which tends
to its destruction, and is within the power of expulsion by the associa-
tion: Id.
A return to a mandamus must set forth distinctly and certainly-not
argumentatively, inferentially, 6r evasively-all the facts essential tQ
the conviction, both as to the cause and mode of proceeding: Id.
A retnrn to a mandamus that the relator was, according to the con-
stitution and by-laws of the association, "tried and convicted of the
charges," is not sufficient, without showing that the association took
proofs which they deemed to be sufficient evidence: Id.
A trial for an offence against the laws of such association is not au
ecclesiastical trial concerning matters of conscience, but an ordinary
secular affair. Qucsre, how far such trials on Sunday comport with our
legislation and institutions: Id.
Jews are bound to observe the civil regulations made for the keeping
of the Christian Sabbath: Id.
Lien on Stock for Debt due the Corporation.-A' common 'law there
is'no lien against stock for debts in favor of the corporation issuing the
stock: iteamship Dock Co. v. Heron's Admr., 52 Penna. -
When such lien exists it is by statutory authority, either expressed
in the act of incorporation, or in by-laws made by authority of the
act: Id.
A stockholder whose estate was insolvent, died indebted to a corpora-
tion; after- his death the directors passed a resolution prohibiting the
transfer of stock by any one indebted to the company: his administra-
trix afterwards sold th6 stock, the purchaser having no notice of the
by-law: Held, that the company was bound to permit a transfer of the
stock: d.
CnummAL LAw.
Accomplice, Admis ns by.-Where one* party receives from another
stolen wool, knowing it to be stolen, and afterwards sells it, the fair pre-
sumption will be that it was to be sold for the joint benefit of the two,
and that the joint undertaking continued until the sale. The declara-
tions of one, intermediate the receiving and the sale, will therefore be
evidence against the other: People v. Pitcher, 15 Mich.
Comn Scold.-A common scold is indictable as a common nuisance:
Commonwealth v. Mohn, 52 Penna.
The 178th section of the revised Penal Code, which provides that
every felony, misdemeanor aid offence whatever not specially provided
for by the act, may and shall be punished as heretofore; saves the com-
mon-law offence of "common scold :" Id.
An indictment charging that the defendant "intending the morals
* * of citizens of this Commonwealth to debauch aid corrupt, openly
and publicly * * in the public highways, wicked, scandalous, and infa-
mous words did if ter in the hearing of the citizens of the Commonwealth,
and to their manifest corruption and subversion, and to the common
nuisance," &c., sufficiently describes the offence : Id.
COUNTY.
Organization of New.-A new county cannot be created and organized
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with a single town, and there cannot be a board of supervisors with a
single member only: People v. Maynard, 15 Mich.
DAMAGES.
Failure to deliver Specific Article.-On failure to deliver specific
articles contracted for, the damages are generally the difference between
the contract price and the market price at the time for delivery: White
v. Tompkins, 52 Penna.
When the contract is to pay a sum of money in specified articles, the
damages on failure are the interest of the money: Id.
When the contract is to pay, for a thing purchased, a fixed sum of
money in specific articles, the vendee has the option to pay in money or
the articles: Id.
A vendee contracted to buy land for a price fixed, "it being expressly
agreed that the said payments are to be made in * * axes." Feld, that
the vendee might elect to pay in money: held, also, that the measure of
damages on failure of vendee was the interest of the money, not the profit
which the vendor might have made on the axes: Id. .
EQUITY.
Lacles.-A party who claims that a decree in equity, obtained against
him when an infant, was fraudulent, but who takes no proceedings to set
it aside for six years after coming of age, until the complainant in the
decree, a principal witness, and the solicitor who acted as guardian ad
litem for him, are all dead, will be held to have lost all equity by his
laches: Campan v. Van Dy ke, 15 Mich.
Specific Performance.-Specific performance will not be decreed of a
land contract which is unfair in its provisions: Chambers v. Livermore,
15 Mich.
Nor of one which the vendee has taken no steps towards performing
until, after being long in default, the value of the land had greatly
increased: Smith v. Lawrence, 15 Mich.
FORMER JUDGMENT.
A decree dismissing a bill for matters not involving merits, is no bar'
to a subsequent suit: Hughes v. United States, 4 Wallace.
FRAUD.-See Check.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Wife as a Creditor of Husband.-It is necessary that a wife should
prove her right as a creditor of her husband with clearness. On this
point there should be no doubt: .ause v. LGilger, Admr., 52 Penna.
Where there is a balancing question as-to whether the money alleged
to have been lent by the wife to her husband came from her means or
his, it is not error in the court to take the question from the jury: Id.
Capacity of Married Woman to make Contracts.-A married woman
has no capacity to contract for the sale of her land or to convey it, except
in the precise statutory mode : Glidden v. Strupler, 52 Penna.
At law femes covert have no capacity to make contracts. Their con-
tracts are nullities, and in this respect equity follows the law : Id.
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In this state a *married woman's power to convey is derived from the
A,ct of 1770, and in regard to powers in their nature statutable, equity
follows the law, however meritorious the consideration: Id.
Equity will not aid defects which are of the essence of the power, nor
sup ply any circumstance for want of which the legislature has declared.
the instrument void: Id.
The contract of a married woman being void, it cannot be ratified un-
less by deed in the mode prescribed by the statute: Id.
Positive acts of encouragement which might operate to estop one sui
juris, will not affect one under legal disability: and a wife can do or
forbear to do no act to affect' her property, unless settled to her separate
use: Id.
A married woman by agreement, signed only by herself and without an
acknowledgment, contracted to sell land: she received one year's inter-
est and a small part of the purchase-money. The purchaser took posses-
sion and made improvements with her knowledge and encouragement.
Held, that neither the principle of estoppel nor compensation would
prevent her recovering the land: Id..
Contract by .a;ried Woma.-A married woman living with her
husband, and carrying on business as a boarding-house keeper, with his
assent, and receiving the proceeds of the business, may bind herself by
purchases of furniture for the business: Tillman v. Shackleton, 15 Mich.
Divorce- Consent.-Decrees will not be made by consent in divorce
oases; not 'even a decree affirming a-decree of divorce made in the
court below and which has been appealed from: Robinson v. Robinson,
15 Mich.
Wife as Witness for Eusban.-The statute which makes husband and
wife competent witnesses for each other, but does not allow the opposite
party to call them except by consent, only confers a privilege which the
party can assert or not at his option. Where a husband was on trial for
larceny, and the facts c6ustituting the defence, if true, must have been
within the knowledge of the wife, who was not called, it was held to be
error in the court to charge the jury that they might draw'unfavorable
inferences against the husband from his failure to call the wife as a wit-
ness: Knowles v. People, 15 Mich.
INTEREST.
A party suing, not on a note, but on the consideration for which the
note was given-and using the note as evidence rather than as the
foundation of the claim-may haie lawful interest on the sum due him,
although by note given on a settlement the party sued may have prom-
ised to pay unlawful interest, and such- as the law of the state where the
note was given visits with a forfeiture of all interest whatever: Newell
v. Nixon, 4 Wallace.
JLws.-See Corporation.
LEGAL TENDER ACTS.
Congress has constitutional power to issue treasury notes of the United
States and make them lawful money and a legal tender for the payment
of debts: ih-olenberger v. Brinton 52 Penna.
636
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The Act of Congress, of February 25th 1862, authorizing the issue
of such notes, is constitutional: Id.
The principal sum which redeems a ground-rent, is a debt within the
meaning of the act: Id.
A ground-rent, payable in " * * * dollars, lawful silver money of the
United States of America," is redeemable by such notes: Id.
So the half-yearly instalment of a ground-rent, payable in "* * dol-
lars, lawful silver money of the United States, each dollar weighing 16
pwt. 6 gr. at least :" Aervine v. Sailor, 52 Penna.
So a ground-rent payable in "lawful money :" Davis v. Burton, 52
Penna.
So a ground-rent payable in "lawful money of the United States :"
K'oener v. Colhoun, 52 Penna.
So a certificate of deposit of "gold, payable * * * in like funds with
interest:" Sandford v. .Hays, 52 Penna.
So a note for a sum of money marked in margin "$14,145 specie,"
which by bankers' rules meant in gold or silver coin: Graham v. Mar-
shall, 52 Penna.
So a note for "* 1 * dollars in g6ld :" Laughlin v. Harvey, 52 Penna.
Where the errors assigned are not sustained by a majority of the
Supreme Court, the judgment of the court below is affirmed: Id.
The condition of a bond for payment in gold coins of the United
States of a particular fineness, A'notwithstanding any law which may
now or shall-hereafter make anything else a tender in payment of debt."
Held, not payable in greenbacks: Dutton v. Pailaet, 52 Penna.
MALIOIOUS PROSEOUTION.
Probable cause.-Where one accused of crime has been discharged
by the examining magistrate, the burden of showing probable cause is
thrown on the prosecutor in an action against him for malicious proe-
cution: Smith v. Ege, 52 Penna.
Probable cause does not depend on the actual state of the case, but
upon the honest and reasonable belief of the party prosecuting: Id.
Probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, without
regard to what induces the belief if it be reasonably sufficient: Id.
Floating rumors are not an adequate foundation for such belief, but'
representations of others, especially of those who have had opportunities
for knowledge, or who have made an investigation, are: d.
A murder having been committed, the defendant employed detectives,
who discovered facts, tending to show the guilt of the family of which
the accused was one; the facts were reported to- the defendant and his
counsel, who advised a prosecution. Beld, that he had reasonable
ground for belief, and that probable cause had been shown: Id.
There is always a presumption in favor of the decisions of the courts
below. The plaintiff in error therefore must furnish to the Supreme
Court the means of determining with certainty, and in such a case as
an action for malicious prosecution, the whole evidence duly certified
must be given: Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.-See Contractor.
Right to Jury Trial.-Municipal corporations being creatures of
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legislation, have.no constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, and such
trial may be denied to them: Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Penna.
Public Purpose--Borrowing Money -A provision in the charter of a
city corporation authorizing it to borrow money for any public purpose,
whenever, in the opinion of the -City Council, it shall be* expedient to
exercise it, is a valid power. Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wallace 654,
affirmed: Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wallace.
Money borrowed by such a corporation to construct a plank-road, if
the road leads from, extends to, or passes through the limits of the
corporation, is borrowed for a public purpose within the meaning of the
provision : Id.
Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wallace 294, and Gelpcke v. City of
PDubugue, 1 Wallace 175, affirmed, and the doctrine reasserted, that
if municipal bonds, when made, were valid by the constitution and laws
of a state as then expounded; by the highest judicial authority whose
duty it was to interpret them, no subsequent judicial exposition of an
opposite kind will make them invalid: .id.
Liabilityfor Defective Wals.&-A municipal corporation is not liable
to an individual *injured in passing along a walk, in consequence of a
defect therein, unless the city authorities had notice of the defect, or
it was of a charater likely to attract attention: Dewey v. Detroit, ] 5
N:zEGrj No.--See Contractor.
Noniox.
Possession of Land as Notice of Eguitdes.-Possession of land by a
grantor is not notice of equities in him as against his own conveyance.
The presumption will be that he holds in subordination to the title of the
grantee. And the same presumption will obtain if his title has been
transferred by legal'proceeings: Dawson v. Danbury Bank, 15 Mih.
PARTITION.
WKat Title pases by.-The effect of a decree in partition in the
Orphans' Court is to divide what descends to the heirs, not to transfer
the title from the decedent to his heir: Dresher et al. v. Allentown Water
Co. et 41., 52 Penna.
Partition' operates only upon the parties to it, who are the heirs: the
creditors are no parties: Id.
The adjudication is no more than that he to whom the land is adjudged
shall hold it in severalty, and assures to him nothing but the title of
his co-heirs: Id.
The jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court over the settlement of a
decedent's estate, cannot be ousted or diminished by partition : Id.
Therefore, if after the land of a decedent has been adjudged to one
of the heirs, it is. afterwards sold by order of the Orphans' Court for the
payment of the decedent's debts, the title of the purchaser will prevail
against that of the heir: Id.
PosT-OFFIcEs.
Power of Postmaster-General.-By the legislation of Congress the
Postmaster-General has the power to "establish post-offices" as well
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where the commissions of the office amount to or exceed $1000 as where
they do not: Ware v. United States, 4 Wallace.
Unless there is some provision in the Acts of Congress restraining its
exercise, the power to establish post-offices, as interpreted by usage
coeval with the creation of the Post-Office Department and recognised
in Congressional legislation, infers a power to discontinue them. And
deputy postmasters occupy their offices, subject to the contingency that
such offices may be so discontinued: Id.
Possessing thus the power to discontinue post-offices, the Postmaster-
General may exercise the power, notwithstanding that the deputy post-
masters have been appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, and under a statute which enacts that the
appointee shall hold his office for the. term of four years unless sooner
removed by the President: Id.
If he do exercise it, the office of deputy postmaster is, in such cases,
gone. There is no longer a deputy postmaster at that place: Id.
Quo WAXRANTO.
Venue.-A proceeding by guo warranto in the Supieme Court, to try
the right to a county office, is local In character, and must be sent for
trial to the county where the duties are to be exercised, unless cause for
changing venue is shown: People v. Cicotte, 15 Mich.
RAILROAD.
Tickets-Stopping, off a Tran.-A passenger Who obtains through
tickets over two lines-the -tickets being issued on a connected sheet,
and to be separated when one is used-is not obliged to use both on one
continuous journey, but on arriving at the end of one line, has a right
to stop off, and to use the remaining ticket at his convenience after-
wards: Brooke v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 15 Mich.
SHIPPING.
Contracts by Shipmaster.-The master of a ship navigating the river
St. Clair has no authority on'behalf of the owner to make a season con-
tract for keeping up lights along the channel for convenience in passing
in the night, when the owner is at hand and may be consulted : .Strong.
v. Saunders, 15 Mich.
STAmp ACT.
State Writs.-The Act of Congress, requiring legal process to be
stamped, cannot constitutionally apply to the process issued by state
courts: Fifield v. C7ose, 15 Mich.
SUNDAY.-See Corporation.
SunzY.-See Bank.
WITNESS.
False Testimony-Corrooration.-It is not error in a court to charge
the jury that, notwithstanding a witness may have knowingly sworn falsely
in one particular, they may still believe him in other matters in respect
to which he is corroborated by other testimony: Knowles v..Peoale, 15
Mich.
